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By analyzing the types of human rights’ violations in non-international armed 
conflicts, the evolution of human rights and humanitarian law, and the behavior of armed 
groups, the thesis will develop different ways - inspired by the work of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and NGOs - for protecting the civilians’ basic rights in these 
conflicts.  
Human rights’ violations and non-international armed conflicts are, to a certain extent, 
often interdependent. Numerous non-international armed conflicts are born because of human 
rights’ violations: armed groups and local militias involved in these conflicts were formed in 
reaction to the violation of the basic rights of local minorities. Once these armed groups were 
created, initially to protect the oppressed minorities, they often become those who will 
commit human rights’ violations against the population. In other terms, human rights’ 
violations and non-international armed conflicts nourish each other.  
Also, for protecting civilians and providing them humanitarian help, NGOs need to 
dialogue with armed groups, and, sometimes, even to collaborate with them. But by doing 
this, they indirectly give a certain legitimacy to armed groups and weaken states’ authority. In 
the long-term, this can create more conflicts and weaken the rule of law in the country 
concerned, leading to more human rights’ violations. The thesis’ recommendations will focus 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Massive human rights’ violations happen in war times. Mass rapes, the use of child 
soldiers, enslavements, massacres, depravation or destruction of civilians’ property, forced 
displacement of population, or human trafficking are facilitated by war. Wars and armed 
conflicts, because they weaken the rule of law, facilitate the commission of human rights 
violations. In time of war, not only states and entities that have the authority to protect 
individuals’ fundamental rights cannot do that, but they can also violate these fundamental 
rights. To protect civilians in time of war, the first step is to understand how contemporary 
conflicts are shaped in order to address this issue with effectiveness.  
Since World War II, most armed conflicts are not interstate wars: they essentially 
involve non-state actors such as armed groups that might be funded by states but still usually 
present themselves as independent. Armed groups sometimes take over large territories and 
they can function just like states do1. At the same time, human rights law and practitioners 
essentially address states and the states themselves do not contribute with effectiveness to the 
development and implementation of texts such as the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.  As argued by Andrew Clapham2, non-state actors such as armed 
opposition groups and private security companies have human rights obligations just like 
states do. Since international humanitarian law hardly applies to non-state actors in armed 
conflicts, this is a necessity to develop and adapt it. Based on the literature mentioned below, 
the thesis will try to answer to the question: how to protect human rights in non-international 
armed conflict? 
 The answer to this question will be divided into four parts. First, it is necessary to 
understand how armed conflicts have evolved over past decades and how their evolution had 








conflicts essentially involve armed groups, some specific human rights violations are more 
likely to occur because armed groups are not held accountable like states are. Second, if 
international human rights and humanitarian law tried to adapt themselves to this modern 
form of warfare, the adaptation of international law is not enough for protecting civilians’ 
human rights: the determining factor that will allow a sufficient level of protection is the work 
of human rights practitioners (from Non-Governmental Organizations or the United Nations 
notably) in armed conflicts. Third, numerous Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and 
international structures such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or Geneva Call 
engaged into a dialogue with armed groups in order to protect basic human rights: this 
dialogue was possible because of the rationality of armed groups. Hence, using the rationality 
of armed groups can be used as a path to enforce basic human rights. However, numerous 
obstacles exist: states’ reaction to this strategy but also the fact that all armed groups are not 
opened in the same way to a dialogue with human rights workers, even if it is their long-term 
interest. As a conclusion, it appears that this strategy can only be effective if armed groups are 
categorized with effectiveness, regarding their respective motives and logic.  
 
 
Chapter 2: Methodology section 
The thesis will use a mixed approach (both quantitative and qualitative). It will use 
statistical data on modern armed conflicts and armed groups notably delivered by Amnesty 
International, Geneva Call, the International Committee of the Red Cross or the existing 
literature (quantitative approach) for analyzing the impact of non-state armed groups’ 
activities on civilian. As the same, the thesis will also adopt a qualitative approach, 





Chapter 3: Definitions 
Human rights: human rights are moral principles or norms that describe certain 
standards of human behavior. They are protected as legal rights in both domestic and 
international law. Human rights are commonly understood as inalienable, fundamental rights 
to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being, regardless 
of their nation, location, language, religion, ethnic origin, or any other status. They are 
applicable everywhere and at every time, universal and egalitarian. Hence, not only human 
rights are applicable in time of war but human rights of civilians in warfare must be 
considered as a priority because of the many threats on them.  
Civilian casualties: civilian casualties occur when civilians are killed or injured by 
non-civilians actors, mostly armed groups, military, terrorists or criminals. Under the law of 
war, civilian casualties are civilians who perished or suffered wounds as a result of wartime 
acts.  
War crimes: a war crime is an act that constitutes a violation of the law of war and 
that gives rise to individual criminal responsibility. It notably includes: killing civilians or 
prisoners, torture, destroying civilian property, perfidy, rape, the use of child soldiers, taking 
hostages, pillage, and violations of the principles of proportionality (such as strategic 
bombing on civilian populations).  
Crimes against humanity: acts deliberately committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack or individual attack directed against any civilian or an identifiable part of a 
civilian population. Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity can be committed during 
peace or war. They are not isolated events but are part of a government policy or of a wide 
practice of atrocities tolerated or condoned by a government or a de facto authority. They 




experimentation, ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial punishments, torture, rape, military use of 
children, forced disappearances, and numerous other widespread human rights abuses.  
Non-international armed conflicts: armed conflicts in which the hostilities must 
reach a minimum level of intensity (for example when the hostilities are of a collective 
character or when the government is obliged to use military force against the insurgents) and 
when non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as “parties to the 
conflict”, meaning that they have organized armed forces.  
Armed conflicts: armed conflicts consist in the use of armed force between two or 
more organized armed forces, whether they are governmental or non-governmental. In 
polemology, three types of armed conflicts are usually distinguished: the interstate ones, the 
intrastate ones, and the non-state armed conflicts. Interstate armed conflicts imply belligerents 
that are states. Intrastate armed conflicts refer to armed conflicts implying state and non-state 
actors. Non-state armed conflicts imply non-state actors.  
Asymmetric warfare: asymmetric warfare is a war between belligerents whose 
relative military power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. 
This is typically wars between a standing professional army and an insurgency or resistance 
movement.  
Civil wars: civil war is a war between organized groups within the same state or 
country. The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve 
independence for a region or to change the government.  
Jus ad bellum: the conditions under which States may resort to war or to the use of 
armed force. The United Nations Charter of 1945 contains the core dispositions of jus ad 
bellum, notably the prohibition of the use of force among states and the exception to it (self-




Jus in bello: it regulates the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict. 
International humanitarian law is synonymous with jus in bello, it seeks to minimize suffering 
in armed conflicts by protecting and assisting all victims of armed conflict to the greatest 
extent possible.  
 
Chapter 4: Human rights violations in contemporary armed conflicts 
 
4.1. Over the past few years, the nature of armed conflicts has changed  
 
To understand exactly the factors that lead to human rights’ violations in 
contemporary conflicts, it is essential to understand the context, the nature and the factors of 
these conflicts.  
 
4.1.1. International armed conflicts became the exception  
Until the end of World War I, the use of armed force was not regarded as illegal: it 
was perceived as an acceptable way of settling disputes.  Right after the First World War, the 
1919 Covenant of the League of Nations and the 1928 Treaty of Paris tried to outlaw war. But 
it is only after World War II that this trend has been confirmed, with the adoption of the 
United Nations Charter in 1945. In its second article, the Charter notably states that the 
members of the Organization shall abstain, in their international relations, from resorting to 
the threat or use of force. Meanwhile, the Charter also contains dispositions allowing states to 
engage in individual or collective self-defense in response to aggression by another State. 
Hence, on the basis of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the United Nations Security 
Council is also able to decide to resort to the collective use of force in response to a threat to 




As a result of that, modern wars less occur between two states: they essentially involve 
non-state actors, armed groups that might be funded by states but still usually present 
themselves as independent. When states officially engage into warfare, it is usually by 
claiming that they are acting in conformity with the UN Charter, that they are defending 
themselves from foreign aggression or preventing genocide and human rights abuses on the 
basis of the responsibility to protect. Hence, it appears that states are held responsible for what 
will happen during the conflict. This is not the case with armed groups: most armed conflicts 
today involve armed groups and since these groups are not held accountable like states are, 
they are more likely to commit atrocities against civilians.  
 
4.1.2. Today, most conflicts are intrastate armed conflicts 
The three conflicts that have caused at least 10,000 direct violent deaths in current or 
past years are all intrastate conflicts3. These conflicts are the following: the war in 
Afghanistan, the Iraqi conflict, and the Syrian civil war. The war in Afghanistan has caused 
23,065 deaths in 2017 and between 1,240,000 and 2,000,000 deaths since its start in 1978. 
This war is not a war between two or several states: this is a war between a coalition of states 
(such as the United States of America, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany) and armed groups (such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban).  It was the 
same with Iraq, after the withdrawal of the United States’ troops in 2011: the country has been 
through a rough insurgency against the government before the establishment of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) caliphate in a third of the country in 2014. The conflict 
continued with an international coalition against ISIL’s forces in 2017. The ongoing Syrian 
civil war, which led to the death of between 353,593 to 498,593 people (according to the 







being internally displaced (according to a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ 
estimate of July 2015), is also not an interstate conflicts, at least not directly. The conflict 
involved the Syrian Arab Republic forces, Iran, Russia, the Hezbollah on one side, the 
Democratic Federation of Northern Syria as well as the Free Syrian Army (notably supported 
by France, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany), and armed groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIL.  
 
4.1.3. The factors that explain the proliferation of intrastate wars:  
The Cold War era, between 1947 and 1991, provided the material and ideological 
support that helped to perpetuate civil wars. These wars were mainly fought in weak ex-
colonial states rather than in more stable states that were aligned with the Warsaw Pact and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Superpowers would also indirectly impose Cold War 
ideology to local conflicts. In other cases, local actors used the Cold War ideology to obtain 
support from the superpowers. Civil wars that included pro-communist or anti-communist 
forces lasted 141% longer than the average non-Cold War conflicts. A typical Cold War civil 
war that attracted superpower intervention resulted in wars lasting over three times longer 
than other civil wars4.  
Between 1945 and 1999, 25 interstate wars killed at least 1,000 persons. These wars 
had a median duration of 3 months. In contrast, in the same period, 127 civil wars killed at 
least 1,000 persons. These civil wars occurred in 73 states – more than a third of the UN 
system. They had a median duration of six years. The civil conflicts in this period produced 
refugee flows far greater than their death toll and far greater than the refugee flows with 









The end of the Cold War didn’t mark the end of warfare. According to Samuel P. 
Huntingon and his ‘Clash of Civilizations’ hypothesis, religion and culture will be the primary 
source of conflicts in the post-Cold War era. If, in appearance, this hypothesis looks valid, 
notably regarding the apparent conflicts between the Muslim world and the Western one, 
international alliances demonstrate that this hypothesis is also challenged by tangible facts. 
For example, Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are both considered by Huntington as part of the 
Muslim world are now fighting in Yemen, and each of these two regional superpowers are 
supported by the global superpowers Russia and America. Indeed, there is more a clash inside 
the different civilizations than a clash between them: for example, in Africa, the conflicts are 
held between different groups inside a same country, such as the Kivu conflict in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, or the war between the Seleka and Anti-Balaka in Central African 
Republic; in the Muslim world, the conflict is mainly between the Sunni and the Shia, as 
demonstrated by the civil wars in Iraq, Yemen or Syria. 
 
4.1.4. The origin of most armed conflicts: the feasibility theory  
However, a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity by itself doesn’t make a 
country more prone to civil war. There are little evidences that one can predict where a civil 
war will break out by looking for where ethnic or other broad political grievances are 
strongest. The main factors determining civil violence are not ethnic, religious or grievances: 
the main factors are more the conditions that favor insurgency. Insurgency is a technology of 
military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from 
rural base areas. The concept of insurgency is more closely associated with communist 
insurgency, but the methods have equally served Islamic fundamentalists, ethnic nationalists, 
or “rebels” who focus mainly on traffic in coca or diamonds. Based on the work of Paul 




central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing 
or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices. Foreign base camps, financial support, and 
training also favor insurgency6. Measures of cultural diversity and grievances fail to predict 
civil war while measures of conditions that favor insurgency do fairly well. Fearon and 
Laitin’s analysis and comprehension of the cause of modern conflict is extremely important 
for the understanding of the human rights violations that occur in these form of warfare. As 
explained, the factor leading to most conflict is if these conflicts are “feasible” or not.  
 
4.2. The interdependence of armed groups and human rights’ violations  
 
Armed groups and human rights’ violations are often interdependent. Numerous 
armed groups were formed in reaction to discriminations against minorities, to fight against 
oppressors. And at the same time, these very same armed groups later engaged into the 
commission of crimes against other minorities or local ethnic and religious groups.  
The example of the Mai-Mai in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
perfectly illustrates that. The Mai-Mai are community-based militia groups active in the DRC 
and formed to defend their local territory against other armed groups (numerous internal 
armed conflicts took place in DRC over the past decades, especially in North Kivu). However, 
some of their combatants committed numerous human rights’ violations: for instance, an 
alleged leader of the Mai-Mai ‘Cheka’ called Lieu Col Mayele was captured by the UN 
peacekeeping troops in DRC and the national army: he was suspected of having led a 
coalition of 200 fighters from the Mai-Mai and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (an armed group from Rwanda but who is active in DRC) in 13 villages in DRC 







villagers they had come to protect them. At least 235 women, 52 girls, 13 men and 3 boys 
have been assaulted7.  
To some extent, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) also demonstrates that 
‘dual relationship’ between armed groups and the oppression of minorities. The Rohingya 
population has been described by the United Nations as one of the most persecuted minorities 
in the world, mentioning ethnic cleansing8. The UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
situation in Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana, even stated that “Recent developments in 
Rakhine state are the latest in a long history of discrimination and persecution against the 
Rohingya community which could amount to crimes against humanity”9. This specific 
population has been through dramatic discriminations and persecutions for decades. They 
were denied citizenship under the 1982 Myanmar nationality law and the state of Myanmar 
refused to recognize them as one of the eight “national indigenous races” although it has been 
proved that they were in Myanmar since at least the 8th Century. As reported by Human 
Rights Watch, they were restricted from freedom of movement, state education, and civil 
service jobs. In reaction to all these persecutions, the ARSA was formed in 2013. Since then, 
the group was involved in many attacks against military camps and police posts in Myanmar. 
It also had been accused of attacking the Hindu village of Ye Baw Kya (the ARSA are 
Muslims). More than 100 Hindus (including women and children) were taken hostage and 
later killed.  However, the ARSA denied this last accusation, stating that it only targets police 














4.3. The proliferation of non-international armed conflicts had direct consequences on 
human rights violations in war time  
 
Human rights violations such as rape or the use of child soldiers are both committed 
by states forces and non-state armed groups. However, in recent contemporary conflicts, these 
violations are more often committed by armed groups for strategic reasons. States involved in 
warfare have more means and can afford using technologically advanced weapons. On the 
other hand, armed groups don’t necessarily have access to these weapons; hence they are 
more likely to use pillage, rape, or child soldiers in order to achieve their ‘goals’. Several case 
studies demonstrate that.  
 
4.3.1. Sexual violence in war times: a weapon of demoralization used by armed groups 
Rape occurs easily in wartime and can be committed by various actors. As 
demonstrated by an Amnesty International Report10, rape during times of war has often been 
used a pre-planned and deliberate military strategy, especially in intrastate civil wars because 
rape can be used as a “cheap” weapon against the civilians. Rape has been used as weapon in 
various conflicts, notably those involving genocide or attempt of genocide, such as the 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. First, these rapes are used to instill terror among 
the civilian population, with the intent to dislocate them from their property. Second, this rape 
strategy aims to degrade the chance of possible return by having inflicted humiliation and 
shame on the targeted population. These effects are strategically important for non-state actors 
since it is sometimes necessary for them to remove the targeted population from the land they 







The situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrates that. In that 
region, the prevalence of rape and sexual violence is assumed to be the worst in the world11. 
According to a study led in 201012, 22% of men and 30% of women in Eastern Congo have 
reported conflict-related-sexual violence. Today, it is estimated that 200,000 surviving rape 
victims live in Democratic Republic of the Congo13. Louise Nzigire, a local social worker in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, observed that rape has been a "cheap, simple weapon for 
all parties in the war, more easily obtainable than bullets or bombs"14. In August 2010, more 
than 500 rapes were reported in Eastern Congo: Atul Khare (current Under-Secretary General 
for the United Nations Department of Field Support) even apologized for the fact that UN 
peacekeepers had failed to protect the population from brutalization. 
Other armed groups, even if they claimed being religious, used that ‘weapon’. In 2015, 
Amnesty International reported that the Afghan Taliban had engaged in mass murder and 
mass rapes of Afghan civilians in Kunduz. Female relatives of police commanders and 
soldiers were raped and killed by Taliban fighters. They also raped and killed women they 
accused of providing reproductive health services to women of Kunduz15.  
 
4.3.2. Child soldiers:  the use of child soldiers by armed groups occur more often than 
the use of child soldiers by states in contemporary armed conflicts 
Issued in February 2007 by the UNICEF, the Paris Principles define a child associated 















or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to 
children, boys, and girls, used as fighters, cook, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual 
purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in 
hostilities” 16.  
In 2004, Child Soldiers International reported that 100,000 children were being used 
both by state and non-state armed forces in Africa17. Half of the children involved in warfare 
are in Africa. According to the United Nations, in 2016, children were used by armed groups 
in seven African countries (Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan) and by three state armed forces (Somalia, 
Sudan, and South Sudan)18.   
Child soldiers are usually recruited by armed groups because they are considered as 
cheap to maintain. The willingness of children to fight for honor, prestige, revenge or duty 
rather than for money, and their psychological malleability (which makes them easier to 
control) favor their recruitment.  
In addition, since States are accountable in front of the international community, they 
will avoid, deny or hide the use of child soldiers, unlike armed groups: hence, it is harder for a 
state to use this weapon. The case of the National Youth Service of Zimbabwe illustrates that: 
the National Youth Service was originally conceived as a patriotic youth organization but it 
became a state-sponsored militia, a paramilitary group of youth aged between 10 and 30 used 
to suppress dissent in the country19.  This organization was banned in January 2018. In 
Angola, although the government denied the use of child soldiers, NGOs, such as the 












state forces and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)20. As of 
March 2004, an estimated 16,000 child soldiers needed to be demobilized in Angola, though 
the civil war ended in April 2002. Those who had been child soldiers during the war were 
excused from compulsory military service but could still serve on a voluntary basis; indeed, 
some children who had come of age while in the armed forces chose to stay in the military. 
The examples of Zimbabwe and Angola demonstrate that even if states use child soldiers, 
they will be more likely to hide it because they will be held accountable. On the opposite, 
armed groups use child soldiers without even denying it and in far worst proportion.  
For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to a report 
published on 23 October 2013 by the MONUSCO (UN Peacekeeping mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo)21, almost 1000 cases of child recruitment by armed 
groups were verified between 1 January 2012 and 31 August 2013, predominantly in the 
district of North Kivu. The use of child soldiers in the Kivu conflict constitutes another 
example of the use of child soldiers in the DRC. The UN has asserted that some of the girls 
being as belligerents are also subjected to sexual assault.  
 
4.3.3. Human trafficking in non-international armed conflicts  
As demonstrated by Human Trafficking Search (HTS), human trafficking and armed 
conflicts often coincide in almost all regions of the world. Human trafficking can take many 
forms: forced labor, domestic servitude, the use of child soldiers, or sex enslavement22.  
Today, armed groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant or Boko Haram, 
openly advocate for the enslavement of women and children. These two armed groups’ way 









engage into human trafficking for the very same reasons they use child soldiers: in order to 
generate free labour. But in the ISIL and Boko Haram’s cases, human trafficking is also used 
as a weapon, just like sexual violence in war time: this is considered by these two groups as a 
method of degradation, displacement and subjugation of targeted civilian population23. The 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria notably reported that ISIL’s combatants had participated in 
the sex-enslavements of women and other human trafficking crimes. In Syria, a centralized 
ISIL body, the Committee for the Buying and Selling of Slaves even organizes the Yazidi 
slave market.  ISIL forces sex slaves to use birth control drugs to prevent pregnancy, has 
doctors conducting voluntary examinations to determine female virginity, and even employs 
medical professionals to administer hormone treatments to facilitate early maturation for 
young girls and provide drugs to facilitate rape24. Boko Haram also engaged into similar 
practices: women rescued from Boko Haram reported a slave hierarchy where women who 
refuse to marry the militants become the slaves of the enslaved wives25. 
Besides, as mentioned before, human trafficking can take many other forms than 
sexual enslavement. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, internally 
displaced people have been forced by armed groups to work in mineral and gold mines in 
order to generate natural resources that are then sold into global markets by the armed groups 
that control the mines.  
 
4.3.4. How the asymmetrical dimension of some conflicts leads to more human rights 











Eyal Benvenisti's article 'The legal battle to define the law on transnational 
asymmetric warfare' also highlights this issue. His essay seeks to explore the tensions 
between two radically opposed visions on the regulation of transnational armed conflicts. Eyal 
Benvenisti reports that two visions coexist on that issue: 1) "Because regular armies fight 
against irregular ones who not only disregard the law but also abuse its protections, the 
regular armies should not be expected to comply with the law unilaterally". 2) "Regular 
armies that enjoy significantly more resources and military might than their irregular enemy 
must take additional precautions and assumes more limitations on their exercise of power than 
required in conventional warfare, simply because of the asymmetric power relations"26.  
One empirical example of the consequences of asymmetry in armed conflicts is the 
use of human shield, which constitute one of the worst human rights violations that may occur 
in war. Human shields are essentially used by non state actors in armed conflicts and they 
constitute a strong violation of the most elementary human rights. In their common paper 
'Human shields in modern armed conflicts: the need for a proportionate proportionality' 
(2011), the authors Amnon Rubinstein and Yaniv Roznai assert that the human shield issue 
reveals the paradoxical approach of the international community. According to them, civilians 
are exploited as human shield in asymmetric conflicts by the armed groups. But the 
international community doesn't react as strongly as it would have done if these acts were 
perpetrated by a sovereign state because conflicts involving non-state belligerents are 
considered as 'asymmetric ones' in which the non state actors is supposed to have less means 
than the state one and therefore should have less obligations than the states. They conclude 
that this approach leads to harmful situations in which powerful armed groups can take the 









T. Artz goes further and states, in her 2014 article 'A chink in the armor: how a uniform 
approach to proportionality analysis can end the use of human shield?', that the international 
community's inconsistent response to human shield has placed shield users on an intermittent 
reinforcement schedule, ensuring that this practice remains part of insurgent strategy28. 
In other terms, in warfare, the pressure on armed groups is lighter than the one on 
states and it leads to human rights violations. Hence, this is a necessity to change modern 
humanitarian law and the approach of the international community, in order to make armed 
groups accountable just like states.  
 
4.4. The factors that differentiate human rights violations in international armed 
conflicts and in non-international armed conflicts are: the response given to these 
violations; and the level of accountability of armed forces  
 
Both states and armed groups commit war crimes and massive human rights violations 
during armed conflicts. However, the consequences will not be the same. Since states are 
considered accountable in front of the international community, if their forces commit crimes, 
they will have to take measures, at least for saving some appearances, while armed groups 
will not do so.  
 
4.4.1. The example of the 2012 Minova mass rape in Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The MONUSCO reported that widespread sexual assault has been perpetrated against 
women in North and South Kivu due to this conflict, and this, by all sides of the conflict. 
These assaults included the incorporation of girls into militia forces as sex slaves. The most 







retreated to this tow, the FARDC troops (official army of the DRC) conducted systematic rape 
against the women and girls for three days29. This resulted into a widespread international 
condemnation, prompting the Army of the DRC to begin an investigation in order to 
prosecute the perpetrators of the sexual assaults. It has also been reported that the soldiers 
attacked women’s children. Hence, in 2014, the “Minova Trial” was conducted. It was the 
largest rape tribunal in the nation’s history.  Although more than 1,000 victims were identified 
from the 2012 attacks in Minova, only 47 testified during the trial.  
 
4.4.2. The example of the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi in Yemen 
The ongoing conflict in Yemen also demonstrates that. In 2016, the Houthi movement 
(an armed group that fights against the regular government of Yemen and that has already 
take parts of the country) has been responsible of numerous exactions, violating repeatedly 
elementary human rights. In areas they controlled the Houthi and their allies arbitrary arrested 
and detained critics and opponents as well as journalists, and NGOs practitioners. As reported 
by Amnesty International, arrests were carried out by armed men belonging to the Houthi 
movement, at homes, workplaces, checkpoints, or public venues. These arrests were carried 
out without judicial warrant or stated reasons. Some detainees were subject to torture and 
other barbarian treatments.  According to the Amnesty International 2016/2017 report, the 
Houthi committed these exactions with impunity. The Houthi didn’t lead any serious 
investigations on the violations of IHL by their troops. By contrast, the President Hadi and the 
Saudi-led coalition both established structures to investigate the alleged violations of IHL and 
human rights by their own troops such as the National Commission of Inquiry and the Joint 









least, they tried to give the appearance that they were doing fair investigation, unlike the 
Houthis who neglect this aspect. 
 
4.4.3. The example of the NATO-led coalition in Libya in 2011 
In 2011, following the UN Security Council Resolution n°1973, the NATO-led 
coalition started an intervention in Libya, on the basis of the responsibility to protect. 
According to the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, the NATO “conducted a 
highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties. On 
limited occasions, the Commission confirmed civilian casualties and found targets that 
showed no evidence of military utility”31. Actually, although the NATO had tried to avoid 
civilian casualties, it was unable to do so. Observers and critics pointed out that it led to a 
paradoxical situation: the NATO pretended to protect civilians and at the same, couldn’t avoid 
their deaths and sometimes has been responsible of some of these deaths. For example, 9 
civilians were killed in a NATO airstrike on Tripoli on June 19 and NATO acknowledged 
being responsible for the civilians’ deaths32.   
However, this case demonstrates one thing: the more states are powerful, the more 
they will be accountable for their actions and will have to, at least, save appearances and 
minimizes civilian casualties from their side. Hence, if human rights violations occur in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts, the pursuits and the answers will differ 
whether they are committed by armed groups, weak states or strong states. This situation 
shows how much international humanitarian law needs to be adapted to modern warfare since 










Chapter 5: The necessity to adapt humanitarian law for protecting effectively human 
rights in non-international armed conflicts 
 
5.1. The legal framework for the protection of human rights in armed conflicts has 
continuously evolved over the past decades  
 
5.1.1. The creation of the four Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols  
The relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law is very close. The 
level of protection afforded by human rights law is high in times of peace. But it strongly 
diminishes during armed conflicts. International humanitarian law is only applicable during 
armed conflicts and its instruments are specifically dedicated to regulate armed conflicts, 
containing rules for protecting more effectively civilians than human rights law. Its provisions 
already take into account the principles of humanity, military necessity and proportionality 
and therefore do not allow for derogation. 
Humanitarian law provides protection for the lives and dignity of people; it prohibits 
torture, prescribes rights for persons subject to a criminal justice procedure, discrimination 
and sets provisions for the protection of women and children. Humanitarian law also aims to 
regulate the conduct of hostilities, combatant and prisoner of war status. Humanitarian law is 
part of the international law of armed conflicts. This branch of law was created earlier than 
international human rights law. The different phases of the development of humanitarian law 
are: the Conference of Paris (1856), the Conference of Geneva (1864), of Saint Petersburg 
(1868), of Brussels (1874), The Hague (1899 and 1907) and Geneva (1949 and 1977). The 
most relevant instruments adopted at these conferences are the four Geneva Conventions 




The first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field” was the fourth update of the original 1864 convention 
and replaced the 1929 convention on the same subject. The second Geneva Convention “for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea” replaced the Hague Convention of 1907. It was the first Geneva Convention 
on the protection of the victims of maritime wars. The third Geneva Convention “relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War” replaced the 1929 Geneva Convention on prisoners of 
war. A fourth Geneva Convention has been added to these three conventions that were 
focusing on the conduct of hostilities. This fourth Convention “relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War” was the first Geneva Convention that didn’t deal with 
combatants. Its subject was to protect civilians. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions 
already contained some provisions on the protection of civilians and occupied territory but 
this Convention went further.  
 
Over time, these conventions were found to be incomplete. As demonstrated before, 
the nature of armed conflicts changed with the beginning of the Cold War, and the Geneva 
Convention were addressing an extinct reality. Most conflicts had become internal, civil wars, 
and to some extent asymmetric conflicts. In addition, the cost of these wars for the civilians 
became the main concern when it came to international humanitarian law. This led to the 
adoption of two Protocols in 1977 that extended the terms of the Geneva Conventions with 
additional protections. The Protocol I is related to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts and the Protocol II is related to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts. A last Protocol was added in 2005 and relates to the Adoption 





5.1.2. How humanitarian law protects human rights in war  
Norms that apply in all circumstances are spelled out in the common Article 3 of all 
the Geneva Conventions:  
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the following provisions: 
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, 
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
a. Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; 
  b. Taking of hostages; 
  c. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;  
  d. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to 
the conflict. [...] While human rights law provides for derogation of some rights in times of 
emergency, it is important to note that several human rights may not be derogated from under 




The Additional Protocols contained specific rules dedicated to an effective protection 
of the civilians, notably: 1° The duty to protect the civilian population against dangers from 
military operations (article 51  and 57 of the Protocol I), 2° The duty to remove civilians from 
and not locate military objectives in the vicinity of military objectives (article 58 of the 
Protocol I), 3° The duty to avoid methods or means of warfare that cause unnecessary injury 
or suffering (article 35 of the Protocol I), 4° The Prohibition of forced movement and 
displacement of civilian population (article 17 of the Protocol II), 5° The protection of objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (article 14 of the Protocol II), 6° The 
protection of medical units and transports (article 11 of the Protocol II), 7° The protection and 
care of wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons (article 7 of the Protocol II).  
 
5.1.3. How the International Criminal Court and ad hoc tribunals contribute to protect 
human rights in armed conflicts by pursuing those responsible of war crimes  
While the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols focus on the armed 
conflict, the Rome Statute is about the response given to crimes committed in war. The Rome 
Statute is the treaty that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was adopted on 
17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. The Rome Statute established four core 
international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC can only investigate and prosecute the four core 
international crimes in situations where states are "unable" or "unwilling" to do so 
themselves; the jurisdiction of the court is complimentary to jurisdictions of domestic courts. 
The court has jurisdiction over crimes only if they are committed in the territory of a state 
party (an exception to this rule is that the ICC may also have jurisdiction over crimes if is 




Since World War II and the Nuremberg trials, international criminal tribunals were 
established in the 1990s for responding to the crimes committed during the wars in former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The UN Security Council created the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
Special courts have also been set up to prosecute domestic and international crimes (notably 
in Kosovo, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Bosnia Herzegovina). 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross lawyers, “tribunals such as 
that set up for the former Yugoslavia herald a major step in the implementation of IHL. They 
have contributed to IHL by affirming the customary nature of certain principles, reducing the 
gap in the rules applicable to international and non-international armed conflicts and by 
adapting more traditional provisions of IHL to modern realities through a more flexible 
interpretation”33.   
 
5.2. Is this legal framework really adapted to contemporary non-international armed 
conflicts? 
 
5.2.1. To prevent more human rights violations, international humanitarian law needs to 
evolve more 
Andrew Clapham’s works in this area became a major reference. Clapham’s book 
‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors’ explores the threats posed by non-state 
actors such as multinational corporations, armed oppositions groups, international 
organizations such as the NATO, the EU or the UN to human rights34. This book is 









on states as the only entities which have human rights obligations. But Clapham’s work goes 
beyond and details the issue related to human rights in armed conflicts through an article 
called ‘Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations’ and published in 
the International Review of the Red Cross in September 200635. In this article, he addresses 
the legal obligations of armed non-state actors in conflicts. His main argument is that all sorts 
of non-state actors are increasingly expected to comply with international human rights law. 
As an example of this “change” in the human rights’ approach, we can mention Philip Alston 
(former Special Rapporteur on arbitrary and summary execution) who addressed, in his 
country mission to Sri Lanka’s report in 2006, recommendations to both the State and the 
armed group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam.  
In the paper ‘Privileging asymmetric warfare’, Samuel Estreicher highlights what he 
calls the “changing paradigm” of armed conflicts. International humanitarian law has moved 
away from a contractual model to embrace a largely regulatory model. In other terms, before, 
the paradigm used to essentially involve states36. Therefore, international humanitarian law 
was shaped by these states, to address issues resulting from interstate conflicts. These treaties 
were based on traditional international law principles such as the 'Pacta Sunt Servanda' and 
reciprocity between parties to the treaty. After World War II, international humanitarian law 
shifted slowly from a contractual system to a regulatory one: the treaties such as the 1949 four 
Geneva Conventions essentially contain rules to protect civilians and regulate the operations 
occurring during armed conflicts. This 'legal shift' is the direct result of the practical shift that 










5.2.2. The necessary equal protection of the victims of non-international and 
international armed conflicts  
Victims of non-international armed conflicts face similar problems and need similar 
protection as the victims of interstate armed conflicts. Both in non-state and state armed 
conflicts, fighters and civilians are arrested and detained by the belligerents, forcibly 
displaced, attacks are launched against towns and villages, food supplies transition is 
complicated, and the same weapons are used. However, as of today, the rules applying to non-
state armed conflicts are different from those applying to state armed conflicts.  
The application of different rules to non-international armed conflicts forces 
humanitarian activists to classify the conflict before those rules can be invoked. This 
constitutes a major problem, being theoretically difficult and always politically delicate. To 
classify a conflict implies assessing questions of jus ad bellum (criteria that are to be 
consulted before engaging in war in order to determine whether entering into a war is 
permissible). For example, in a war that implies a state and secessionists, invoking the law of 
non-international armed conflicts implies that the secession is not successful, which is not 
acceptable by the secessionists and provides less protection to civilians. On the other hand, 
implying the law of international armed conflicts implies that the secessionists were 
successful in creating a separate state, which is not acceptable for the actual government. To 
protect their authority and unity among their territories, states hardly agree to treat 
international and non-international armed-conflicts equally.  
Protocol II contains a provision clarifying that nothing it contains shall affect the 
sovereignty of the State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means. But 
on the other hand, the protection of victims of international armed conflicts must necessarily 
be guaranteed through rules of international law. Such rules have long been accepted by most 




reservations, by 196 countries. The problem is that today, most conflicts involved non-state 
actors who are not bound by all these rules. Hence, the civilians in non-international armed 
conflicts don’t benefit from the same protection as the civilians in international armed 
conflicts. The law of non-international armed conflicts is more recent. States have considered 
these conflicts as internal affairs governed by domestic law. Hence, they would hardly accept 
to recognize rules that might legitimate citizens that would fight against their own 
government. However, applying all the rule of contemporary international humanitarian law 
to non-international armed conflicts is a necessity today.  Since most conflicts today are non-
international armed conflicts, humanitarian law must also be binding on non-states parties, 
which means not only those who fight against the government but also armed groups fighting 
each other. If international humanitarian law doesn’t respect the principle of the equality of 
belligerents before it in non-international armed conflicts, it would have an even smaller 
chance of being respected by all armed forces, the states and the non-state ones.  
 
5.2.3. The necessary principle of the equality of the belligerents 
According to some scholars and states like the United States of America and Israel37, 
the 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions did more privilege the guerilla 
strategy, rather than the protection of civilians. These texts appeared as legitimizing irregular 
warfare and as protecting combatants who do not adhere to the traditional criteria for 
distinguishing themselves from civilians.  
In his 2005 paper for the International Review of the Red Cross 'Asymmetrical warfare 
from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action', Toni Pfanner stresses that 
in most of current conflicts, the different parties are increasingly unequal and that the 







involve non-state actors. Therefore, he states that the weaker belligerent is "tempted to have 
recourse to unlawful methods of warfare in order to overcome the adversary's strengths". He 
further insists on the illusionary aspect of the reciprocity principle, which has been used for 
decades as a fundamental motivation for respecting international humanitarian law and basic 
human rights in armed conflicts. This situation led to the development of perfidious behavior 
from both sides38. 
However, even if parties are not necessarily equal in armed conflicts (especially in the 
asymmetrical conflicts), the principle of ‘equal application’ is a necessity for the protection of 
civilians. This principle means that, in international armed conflicts, the laws of war apply 
equally to all who are entitled to participate directly in hostilities, irrespective of the justice of 
their causes. As argued by Adam Roberts, the principle is the strongest practical basis that 
exists for maintaining certain elements of moderation in war. Hence, presupposing that the 
rights and obligations of combatants under the laws of war should apply in a fundamentally 
unequal manner in asymmetrical warfare is “unsound in conception, impossible to implement 
effectively and dangerous in its effect” 39.  
 
5.2.4. Legal arguments asserting that armed groups are bound by international 
humanitarian law just like states do 
Several scholars developed legal arguments asserting that armed groups are bound by 
international humanitarian law, just like states do. For instance, in the article ‘The 
applicability of international humanitarian law to organized armed groups’, Jann K. Kleffner 











When the rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts were created by 
agreement or custom, states implicitly conferred to the non-governmental forces involved in 
such conflicts the international legal personality necessary to have rights and obligations 
under those rules. According to this construction, the states have conferred on rebels the status 
of subjects of international humanitarian law. Otherwise, their legislative effort would not 
have the desired effect which is to protect civilians in war by a series of rules.  
Armed groups may also be considered as bound because a state incurring treaty 
obligations has legislative jurisdiction over everyone found on its territory, including armed 
groups. International humanitarian law obligations become binding on the armed groups via 
the implementation or transformation of international rules into national legislation or by the 
direct applicability of self-executing international rules. Under this construction, international 
humanitarian law is indirectly binding on the rebels but it will be directly binding only if the 
rebels become the effective government.  
Furthermore, armed groups are bound because of the general rules on the binding 
nature of treaties on third parties. This presupposes that those rules are the same for States and 
State-actors and that a given armed group has actually expressed its consent to be bound. The 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of 1969 codified this principle in its article 34: “A 
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent”41. 
Finally, the principle of effectiveness of the treaties also leads to consider armed 
groups to be bound by international humanitarian law. This principle implies that any 
effective power in the territory of a state is bound by the state’s obligations. The term 
“effectiveness” has been used in international law since the mid-20th Century, with various 
meanings since then. Primarily, it refers to the efficacy (actual observance) of law as 







5.2.5. The accountability of individuals who are members of armed groups in front of 
international criminal courts 
The jurisprudence of ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court has discussed the precise range of persons who are addresses of international 
humanitarian law. This range of persons includes members of armed forces or groups. For 
example, in 2016, the International Criminal Court trial of Dominic Ongwen, a former child 
soldier who became a senior commander of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), an armed 
group that committed numerous atrocities in Uganda, began. Ongwen, who is between 35 and 
40 years old, is the first former child soldier to face trial at the controversial institution and the 
first defendant to be both alleged perpetrator and victim of the same crimes. Ongwen was 
abducted by the LRA at the age of 10 when returning from school and is thought to have been 
forced to participate in combat and violent acts against civilians as a child. Most of the 
charges against Ongwen focus on a series of attacks on refugee camps between 2002 and 
2005. One of the worst involved a four-day raid by the LRA on camps in north-eastern Congo 
in December 2009, in which about 350 civilians were killed and another 250, including at 
least 80 children, were abducted. Led by Joseph Kony, a former rebel leader who claimed to 
be religiously inspired, the LRA waged war across five countries in east and central Africa for 
nearly 30 years. The group has been blamed for the deaths of about 100,000 people and the 
abduction of 60,000 children.  
 






It appears that even if international humanitarian law becomes perfectly adapted to 
modern warfare (and it is not totally today), legal guarantees are not sufficient in time of war. 
Hence, other paths must be explored, and are already explored by human rights practitioners 
in armed conflicts, to assure an effective protection of civilians’ basic human rights.  
The ongoing conflict in Yemen, which is shaped by the Shia-Sunni regional rivalry 
through the opposition between the two local powerful states Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
illustrates that. More precisely, the Houthi movement is a Shia armed group, indirectly 
supported by Iran, which fights against the Yemenite government and is military targeted by 
the Saudi-Arabian-led coalition since 2015. As demonstrated by the Houthi's case, these 
armed groups' legal obligation to follow international humanitarian law as well as human 
rights law is largely disrespected in practice. Human rights violations committed by the 
Houthis can be classified in four categories: attacks against civilian facilities; use of anti-
personnel landmines; recruitment of child soldiers; arbitrary arrests. Notably, the Houthi 
endangered civilians in areas they controlled by launching attacks from the vicinity of school, 
hospitals, and homes, exposing residents to attack by pro-government forces, including aerial 
bombing by the Saudi-led coalition. In November 2016, they carried out at least 45 unlawful 
attacks in Ta’iz, killing and injuring civilians. Although they have been engaged, since 2014, 
with Geneva Call regarding the use of anti-personnel landmines and child soldiers, in 2016, 
the Houthi placed anti-personnel landmines that caused civilian casualties42. In addition, as of 
June 2016, it was reported that the Houthi were responsible for 72% of the 762 verified cases 
of recruitment of child soldiers during the conflict43. And the case of the Houthis is only one 









Hence, now, the question is: how to impose, by concrete acts, the respect for basic 
human rights to armed groups?  
 
Chapter 6: The rationality and opportunism of armed groups: a path to enforce human 
rights in non-international armed conflicts  
 
6.1. The necessity for human rights practitioners to directly address armed groups: 
To enforce the respect for basic human rights and IHL in these territories, NGOs and 
the international community need both to address the armed group and engage into a 'rational' 
dialogue. This approach has been recommended before. 
 
6.1.1. NGOs’ work in the field already goes in that sense 
NGOs’ works in the field, like the Geneva Call or the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, are essential. The Geneva Call, for example, is a neutral and impartial NGO 
"dedicated to promoting respect by armed non-state actors for international humanitarian 
norms in armed conflict and other situations of violence". Geneva Call currently focus on the 
ban of anti-personnel mines, protecting children from the effects of armed conflict, 
prohibiting sexual violence, and working towards the elimination of gender discrimination. So 
far, the NGO already engaged in dialogueue with more than 90 non-state armed actors. The 
Geneva Call created an innovative tool called the Deed of Commitment, which aims to 
implement IHL norms and basic human rights in armed groups' activities44. More precisely, 






specific humanitarian norms and be held publically accountable for their commitments” 45. As 
of today, Geneva Call has developed three documents in that way:  
‐ The Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines 
and for Cooperation in Mine Action, launched in 2000;  
‐ The Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of 
Armed Conflict, launched in 2010;  
‐ The Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of 
Armed Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination, launched 
in 2012.  
By signing these documents, armed groups agree to take the necessary measures to 
enforce their commitments, to allow and to cooperate in the verification of their compliance 
by Geneva Call. They also recognize the commitment as a first step towards a wider 
acceptance of humanitarian norms. After a signature, Geneva Call supports and monitors the 
implementation of the signed Deeds. So far, 52 armed groups have signed the Deed of 
Commitment banning anti-personnel mines, 26 armed groups have signed the Deed of 
Commitment protecting children in armed conflict, and 24 armed groups have signed 
the Deed of Commitment prohibiting sexual violence and gender discrimination. 
 
6.1.2. The necessity to involve armed groups in the international law making process 
Also, involving armed groups in the international law making process has been 
proposed as a potential solution by Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran. In their paper 
'Lawmaking by non-state actors', through the study of powerful armed groups in South Asia 
or South America, they reported interviews of members of armed groups stating that they 






the lawmaking process, although they truly feel concerned about international humanitarian 
law and human rights principles46. However, this argument can be contradicted by the strong 
differences that exist between each armed groups'. Hence, their argument cannot be 
generalized to all armed groups. 
In opposite, the idea of engaging armed group in productive dialogue, encouraging 
them to allow humanitarian visit in their camps and controlled areas or to make unilateral 
declarations of recognition of international humanitarian law principles appear as a more 
realistic approach. This is actually the approach that the International Committee of the Red 
Cross adopted in Africa47 and it needs to be developed.  
 
6.2. These dialogues and actions were possible because of armed groups’ rationality  
 
6.2.1. Armed groups need people’s support 
In his book 'On Guerilla Warfare', Mao Tse Tong emphasizes to the need for those 
who engage into guerillas to adapt themselves to local populations ("like a fish in the sea"48). 
Popular support is not sufficient but essential.  Without this support, an armed group cannot 
succeed in keeping the territories it conquered. Even one of the most uncontrollable and 
violent group manifested its need for popular support: the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
regularly issues its own 'magazine' in order to spread its propaganda and gain people’s 
support.  
 










As demonstrated by Zachariah Mampilly rebel groups can engage in different kind of 
symbolic governance, through their engagement in international diplomacy. The scope for 
outsiders to engage politically with violent insurgencies is greater than commonly thought. 
Rebels look to involve third parties, international community, and even the states they are 
fighting. Such diplomacy may lead to decrease international support for the incumbent 
government. Insurgent diplomacy may actually even influence the policies that third parties 
adopt49.  
Besides, armed groups look for foreign support. Foreign support can be determining 
for an armed groups. External political support for the rebellion notably bolsters its ability to 
provide public goods. For example, in Yemen, the Iranian support for the Al-Houthi has been 
determining in the armed group’s success in taking over Sana’a in 2014. However foreign 
support from regionally powerful states is not a sufficient factor to explain military and 
politically success of an armed group50. To demonstrate this, Paul Staniland compared two 
groups materially helped by Pakistan in the Indian-administrated Kashmir from 1988 to 2003, 
the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and the Hizbul Mujahideen. The first one was 
extremely popular among the people but failed into creating a robust process of internal 
control, though it was torn by splits and internal defiance. The second, even if it wasn’t 
popular, didn’t collapse as the JKLF did. On the contrary, the Hizb became a “sophisticated 
political movement, not just a bunch of gun-toting thugs” 51. The Hizb’s success can be 
explained by its members’ tight relations with the Jamaat-Al-Islami, which gave the Hizb an 












6.2.3. Armed groups’ governance 
The scholar Ana Arjona, who contributed to Zachariah Mampilly’s book ‘Rebel 
Governance’, distinguishes two forms of rebel governance: the ‘aliocracy’ and the 
‘rebelocracy’. In the ‘aliocracy’ system, armed groups do not rule beyond security and 
taxation: combatants established rules to preserve public order, such as forbidding theft and 
rape, and they collect contributions, taxes, food, and money in exchange; but they won’t go 
further in term of governance. On the other hand, the ‘rebelocracy’ system involves 
intervention that goes beyond security and taxation such as: extralegal justice system in many 
of the areas ruled by rebels; eradication of delinquency and crime among civilians, providing 
public goods (health, education, and other public services); intervention in economic matters; 
norms concerning variety of issues including domestic violence, personal appearance, sexual 
conduct, and freedom of speech; finally, rebelocracy also tightly controlled politics. 
 Therefore, it appears that armed groups are sufficiently rational for organizing themselves in 
order to gain legitimacy.  
 
6.2.4. Examples of armed groups that have ruled with effectiveness 
UGANDA: Isaya Mukirane on 30 June 1963: declared the formation of the 
Rwenzururu Kingdom after leading a secessionist campaign from the newly independent 
Uganda state: Earlier, President Milton Obote had proclaimed a state of emergency over the 
mountainous region seeking to undermine the kingdom’s existence. Despite the efforts of the 
Ugandan government, the rebel monarchs did not buckle. Instead, Rwenzururu leaders 
organized a complex governmental bureaucracy composed of eleven ministries headed by a 
cabinet. They developed a legislature and a public service commission. By 1966, the 
Rwenzururu government had a salaried staff of 1000 bureaucrats who collected taxes from 




but this administration proved more than capable of meeting the needs of the local civilian 
population (100,000) through the provision of basic public goods, including security force and 
education system. It worked for 20 years, governmental system of impressive sophistication, 
before being reintegrated to the Uganda state in 1982 (Kasfir 2004). 
COLOMBIA: by the early 1980s, the FARC took the control of a vast territorial 
enclave in the jungles and plains bordering the Andes Mountains in Colombia’s southeast: 
The FARC administration provided substantial services to the inhabitants of its territory, 
including health and education systems, a police force to maintain stability, courts to 
adjudicate civil and criminal disputes, and even loans to farmers and small businessmen. The 
FARC also engaged in extensive public works projects, building roads and other 
infrastructure construction. They also achieved considerable international validation during 
peace negotiations that began in 1998, when President Albert Pastrana effectively partitioned 
the country in two, officially sanctioning the rebellion’s control. However, FARC’s territorial 
holding has been reduced past few years, but the organizations still retains control of large 
portions of the country, where it continues to govern the daily lives of residents.  
 
6.3. The ways human rights practitioners used armed groups’ rationality in the past for 
helping civilians  
 
The December 2006 International Review of the Red Cross article ‘Respect for 
international humanitarian law by armed non-state actors in Africa’ (by Churchill Ewumbue-
Monono) also demonstrates, in a certain way, the rationality of armed groups and the 
willingness of numerous of them, for opportunistic reasons, to gain legitimacy by complying 







international humanitarian law and their recognition of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross’s (ICRC) work have increased the effectiveness of humanitarian aid distributions 
in armed conflicts. The article stresses on the issues related to the participation of non-state 
actors in African conflicts with regard to respect for international humanitarian law: respect 
for protected persons such as children, civilian populations, and prisoners of war; methods of 
conducting hostilities; type of weapons used in conducting hostilities; recognition of the role 
of humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC as neutral humanitarian intermediaries. To 
address these issues, a number of instruments and strategies have already been put in place: 
the signing of special agreements on visits to prisoners of war; unilateral declarations; 
provision for amnesties in peace agreements; application of Deeds of Commitments initiated 
by the international humanitarian organization Geneva Call; integration of international 
humanitarian law into African peace agreements; the military doctrines of the armed non-state 
parties to a conflict. The article further mentions and details a series of measures taken by 
African armed non-state actors to ensure the respect for international humanitarian law such 
as the Declaration of the 5 April 1988 of the UNITA (Angola) which authorized he ICRC to 
visit detained persons and captured Angolan soldiers, the Declaration of the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front of 22 October 1992 in Geneva which recognized the ICRC’s activities.  
 
6.3.1. Concrete examples of armed groups who accepted to respect humanitarian law 
A number of unilateral declarations by armed non-states parties to a conflict have been 
used as mechanisms for ensuring compliance with IHL in accordance with Article 96.3 of the 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (this article gives to “national liberation 




Geneva Conventions). The following unilateral declarations by African non-state actors can 
be mentionned as examples53:  
‐ Declaration of 23 May 1968 in Kampala by the rebel Biafran authorities: it pledged to 
respect civilian populations, to give the ICRC facilities for the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and organized the exchange of prisoners of war through the 
ICRC.  
‐ Declaration of 16 June 1977 by Joshua Nkomo of the African National Congress and 
the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ANC-ZAPU): it pledged to apply the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. 
‐ Declaration of 23 September 1977 by Bishop Muzorewa of the United African 
National Council (UANC): it pledged to apply the Geneva Conventions and their 
Additional Protocols. 
‐ Declaration of 25 July 1980 by the Uniato National para a Independencia Total de 
Angola (UNITA): it pledged to respect the fundamental rules of IHL.  
‐ Declaration of 28 November 1980 by the African National Congress (ANC, South 
Africa) president, Oliver Tambo: it pledged that the organization would respect the 
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols.  
‐ Declaration of the 15 July 1981 of the South West Africa People’s Organization 
(SWAPO) President, Sam Nujoma, to the ICRC on the respect for the Geneva 
Convention and its Additional protocols.  
‐ Declaration of 6 October 1988 in Geneva by the SWAPO secretary-general Toivo ya 
Toivo: it assured the application of IHL by the SWAPO. 
‐ Declaration of the Rwandese Patriotic Front of 22 October 1992 in Geneva: it 








Apart from these formal declarations, many liberation movements also made a number 
of statements of commitments to respect the IHL, for example54: 
‐ The statements of commitment of December 1975 by Ethiopian liberation movements 
such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF), and by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saugua el Hamra and Rio de 
Oro in Western Sahara (POLISARIO) to respect IHL.  
‐ The statements of commitments in 1976 by the representatives of nationalist 
movements in southern Africa, notably the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU), the ANC and SWAPO, to co-operate with the ICRC in promoting IHL.  
‐ The pledge by various armed groups in Angola, given in January 1976 during the 
OAU Extraordinary Summit on Angola, to respect their IHL commitments.  
 
6.3.2. Integration of international humanitarian law in military doctrines of armed 
groups 
International humanitarian law’s principles have been integrated in the military 
doctrine of numerous rebel movements such as the Uganda’s National Resistance Movement 
(1980-1986), the Rwandan RPF (1990-1994) or the SPLM in Sudan to some extent. These 
non-state actors formulated a set of directives governing the conduct of hostilities: to take 
captives prisoner rather than execute them; to only attack military objectives and combatants; 
to desist from using terror tactics; to punish violations of international humanitarian law in 










6.4. The obstacles related to this approach 
However, serious obstacles exist regarding the development of the Geneva Call or the 
ICRC's approaches. The first main obstacle is the one related to states’ sovereignty: there is a 
perception that the negotiation of special agreements with non-state actors or acceptance of 
their unilateral declarations confers on them recognition by humanitarian organizations. The 
second main obstacle is the conflict between justice and national reconciliation: starting to 
negotiate with armed groups will give them legitimacy, strengthen them and exacerbate 
internal divisions inside the same countries. So the question is: how to overcome these 
obstacles?   
 
Chapter 7 : Conclusions, lessons learnt, solutions 
 
7.1. Armed groups have different motives and obey to different logics: in order to 
address effectively this issue, there is a necessity to categorize them 
 
All armed groups do not obey to the same logics and do not have the same goals. The 
e Free Syrian Army in Syria, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, the Mai-Mai 
in Democratic Republic of the Congo and the FARC in Columbia will not act the same way 
and be equally receptive to human rights issues. To allow the human rights workers in the 
field to address armed groups with effectiveness, it is necessary to categorize these armed 
groups according to their level of receptivity to human rights issues. Regarding the current 
situation, three categories of armed groups can be identified (they are ranked regarding their 





The first category concerns armed groups that are fighting for a political purpose and 
that have officially declared themselves as concerned by human rights and humanitarian law: 
this category is the easiest one to dialogue with. Since these armed groups fight for power and 
to replace the government, they will be more sensitive to the necessity of gaining people’s 
support. Hence, they will be more likely to avoid acts of terror against the population. In 
addition, their official commitment to human rights already bound them in a certain way, 
making them accountable, and they will be more likely to try to save appearances like states 
do when it comes to human rights violations by their own troops. As an example of these 
armed groups, we can mention the Syrian Democratic Forces, a multi-ethnic and multi-
religious alliance of Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian, and Syriac militias.  
 
The second category concerns armed groups that are fighting for a political purpose 
but that have shown reject towards human rights principles. The only way human rights 
practitioners have to address these armed groups is to use their rationality: if they fail getting 
people’s support or at least their tacit consent, they will never be able to maintain their power 
and will quickly loose territories they take. This will be the case for example of the Houthi in 
Yemen. These groups in particular are often religious extremists. Hence, even if these armed 
groups need people’s support, because of their own paradigm, they will reject basic human 
rights especially when it comes to women, LGBT, and religious minorities.  
 
The third category concerns armed groups that are fighting for economical purpose 
and that shows no interest for human rights at all.  Since their main purpose is looting and 
pillage, they are the hardest category to dialogue with: people’s support matter less to them 





These categories are inspired by the model developed by Collier and Hoeffler in their 
work ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance’56, in which they presented two models of rebellion: the 
‘looting model of rebellion’ in which the objective of rebellion is simply ‘the capture of loot’; 
and a ‘justice seeking model’ in which the rebels are driven by the desire to rectify perceived 
injustice.  
 
7.2. According to the category they belong to, specific solutions can apply for building a 
productive dialogueue with these armed groups.  
 
Once these categories are made, specific solutions must be developed for each of 
them. These solutions must take into account the resistance of states regarding potential 
dialogueue with armed groups and moreover the risk to legitimize these armed groups and 
creating more disorder and conflicts within a country by doing so. All the recommendations 
proposed below, except those concerning the first category of armed groups, are meant to be 
applied with the collaboration of states.  
 
The recommendations are based on four core directing principles: 1) The accountability 
of armed groups: they must be considered as responsible as states are for any human rights’ 
violations they do; 2) The advocacy, by using rational arguments, for the protection of human 
rights and civilians in general (through dialogue, public campaigns); 3) Raising awareness 
about the crimes committed by armed groups; 4) Strengthening the United Nations field 








Recommendations for the first category (armed groups with political purpose and who 
expressed an interest into human rights issues):  
- Continuing and deepening the dialogue already opened between them and NGOs, 
Geneva Call and the International Committee of the Red Cross is a necessity to 
prevent more human rights violations.  
- However, this dialogue should not transform itself into an official support to the 
armed group and must remain focused on preventing human rights violations. For 
example, it must consist into the signature of the Deed of Commitment mentioned 
below or code of conducts and then goes beyond that. Through this dialogue, the goal 
is to obtain from the armed group to allow access for humanitarian helps and 
investigations regarding the respect of their engagements. Since these armed groups 
are looking for power and legitimacy, this will make NGOs’ work easier.  
- In the long-term, the more this dialogue will be productive, the more these armed 
groups will be held accountable for their actions. Hence, their leaders will be more 
concerned by human rights’ violations made by their troops.  
 
Recommendations for the second category (armed groups with political purpose and 
who expressed their reject for human rights issues):  
- Starting a dialogue essentially based on the need of these armed groups to obtain 
people’s support. It will be useless to try to use a discourse based on the protection of 
human rights and civilians in general: if these armed groups, such as the Houthi in 
Yemen, expressed a certain reject or disinterest for these issues, their leaders will not 
even try to control their troops’ behavior when it comes to this topic. The main way to 
dialogue with them in order to protect civilians is to use their need for people’s 




- A second aspect will be essential when it comes to civilian protection from this 
category of armed groups’ crimes: the military aspect. This aspect will essentially 
involve the United Nations and, to some extent, neighbors states. The UN 
peacekeeping missions today often assist military failed and weak states. This is 
notably the case with the MONUSCO in DRC, which assist and work closely with the 
national army. This situation also happens between states: when Islamist groups 
started to take over territories in Mali, the French army, at the request of the Malian 
government, intervened in 2013 to help the Malian army against these extremist 
groups.  
 
Recommendations for the third category (armed groups with looting purpose):  
- The use of UN Peacekeeping missions’ camps for disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration of former combatants. As of today, the United Nations have settled 
numerous camps for former combatants. For instance, the Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration section of the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations leads numerous policies, such as the Community Reduction Violence, in 
order to teach to former combatants how to reintegrate themselves into the civil 
society. Advocating in favor of these camps, investing more in them in order to make 
them more appealing to armed groups’ combatants will help to decrease the number 
of persons that engage into armed groups for looting purpose. For example, numerous 
individuals from armed groups in DRC joined voluntary these camps to avoid the 
horror committed by the armed groups they used to belong to.  
- Enforcing the jurisdictional system (so that the armed groups can be held accountable 
for their actions, even if they haven’t expressed any concern for human rights law): 




support, they are not looking for power, and they do not care about human rights. 
Therefore, a totally different solution should be used: the creation of criminal courts 
by the United Nations system and that will be protected by UN Peacekeepers. If these 
groups are active in some countries, it means that the state is not strong enough to 
pursue them in trial. Hence, this must be done by an international authority, with the 
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